A Concept of a Foreign Policy

Trump's foreign affairs team takes shape.

Donald Trump’s second-term foreign policy remains something of a black box, but his senior appointments offer some clues. Those appointments began inauspiciously last Sunday with a pair of non-appointments, when Trump announced that Mike Pompeo and Nikki Haley wouldn’t join his administration. But Trump’s decision to ditch those two wasn’t surprising, really: Haley ran against him, and Pompeo has at times sounded critical. Trump’s actual selections have mollified fears of full-blown isolationism. His appointments signal a hard line on China and Iran; a little more ambivalence on Ukraine; and a desire to purge the military of “wokeness.” But they also demonstrate his unending thirst for loyalty.

Marco Rubio is a good choice for State, and Mike Waltz a good choice for National Security Adviser. Both are China hawks and Iran hawks. Both have also strongly supported Ukraine. Waltz is perhaps the weaker of the two on this point—he voted against one of the most recent aid bills, and has expressed concerns about long-term, open-ended aid. And Rubio recently called the war a “stalemate that’s costing lives,” hinting at the need for some kind of swift conclusion. But Waltz has also called for an end to restrictions on the use of American weapons on Russian soil. That combination of hawkishness and war-weariness hints at Trump’s desire for a swift, negotiated resolution—but also signals willingness to threaten Putin with the kind of consequences necessary to induce serious talks. Waltz also wants more European contributions to Ukraine’s defense and to NATO in general, a desire that will likely carry over from the first Trump administration. 

Kyiv, for what it’s worth, has greeted Trump’s election with mixed feelings, or even cautious optimism. President Biden’s increasingly timid and hesitant approach has created real worries about the war’s long-term trajectory. Trump, some Ukrainians seem to think, might shake things up in a good way, and his need to look strong might keep him from handing Putin an easy win. 

What about other issues? Rubio has been very critical of Nicolas Maduro, which could signal a harsher line on Venezuela. Interestingly, Rubio has also strongly supported the Kurds, while Waltz co-chaired the congressional Kurdish Caucus. That affinity might temper Trump’s likely desire to pull remaining American troops from Syria. 

Waltz, in particular, might also signal a willingness to use force against Mexican cartels. Waltz introduced an AUMF—authorization for the use of military force—against those cartels last year.

John Ratcliffe as CIA director continues the anti-China theme. In late 2020, he published a Wall Street Journal op-ed called, “China is National Security Threat Nr. 1.” He also made some strident pro-Ukraine comments back in 2022, though I can’t find anything more recent. 

Elise Stefanik as UN ambassador and Mike Huckabee as ambassador to Israel, meanwhile, signal an aggressive anti-Iran approach (perhaps a little too aggressive in Huckabee’s case—some of his comments on Israel’s West Bank settlements haven’t been very prudent, or very helpful to the prospect of a two-state solution). 

What’s most interesting here is the man who hasn’t made it yet: Elbridge Colby. Colby was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force in the first Trump administration, Development, and was making a play for a top job this time around. Tucker Carlson interviewed Colby a few days ago. Sohrab Ahmari has endorsed him, too. You might say he’s NatCon-world’s favorite foreign policy guru. But that means he’s very soft on Russia, though OK on China. His failure to bag a top job will disappoint those Trump-backers who expected true isolationism.

Meanwhile, Trump’s nominee for Defense, Pete Hegseth, signals a different priority: anti-wokeness. Hegseth—a Fox News commentator, though also a decorated veteran and a graduate of Princeton and Harvard—seems to hold conventional views on substantive foreign policy issues. But he wrote a book on “wokeness” in the military, and has even said that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should be fired for being too woke. He also opposes allowing women to serve in combat roles. That anti-wokeness message may be part of a larger Trump effort to exert closer personal control over the military, an effort that could include a “warrior review board” to remove some three-and four-star generals, as the Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday. 

And there’s the elephant in the room: Tulsi Gabbard. Gabbard thinks Bashar al-Assad “is not the enemy of the United States,” believes “the spirit of Aloha” could solve the war in Ukraine, and blamed the US for ignoring Putin’s “legitimate security concerns.” (Interestingly, though, while writing this article, I learned that she combined her support for Assad with criticism of Trump’s Syrian pull-out and support for the Syrian Kurds. I do not understand how that combination of views fits together.) I don’t think she’ll be confirmed as Director of National Intelligence, though perhaps the Senate will decide that kicking Matt Gaetz to the curb is enough resistance to Trump’s agenda. If confirmed, it’s hard to imagine she’ll get along with the rest of this national security team. We may be in for another high-turnover administration. One way or another, it’s clear Trump made this choice for reasons of loyalty, not competence—a tendency that bodes ill indeed.

Jonathan Meilaender is a JD candidate at Harvard Law and is concurrently engaged in a Master’s program in German and European studies at Georgetown University. He received his BA in Politics from Saint Vincent College where he was also Editor-in-Chief of the Saint Vincent College Review. @JMeilaender