Anti-Ukraine Theater
The kayfabe of anti-Ukraine theater doesn't reflect the foreign policy realism of Thucydides.
Politics has always been a performative business. It more closely resembles the kayfabe world of professional wrestling than most people would be comfortable admitting, and social media has magnified this tendency. Theatrical rituals and catchphrases are easy ways to distinguish oneself as a hero to one’s preferred group of fans and a villain to the other team that needs beating in an election. Donald Trump, for all his awful qualities, understands this, and it is a foundation of his staying power in the national spotlight.
Sometimes, these theatrics are necessary for party cohesion and even enhance the national interest. Unfortunately, they also dull reason and often make for less effective politics and policy. For a Republican Party already facing many such problems, the addition of anti-Ukraine theater to its list of in-group shibboleths is one such example and detrimental to America’s overall interests.
I get why anti-Ukraine theater would have an appeal. I, too, roll my eyes when I hear catchphrases like “freedom” and “democracy” in relation to foreign policy. I’ve witnessed one too many foreign misadventures under such nonsensical Wilsonian banners in my life. By many reputable accounts, Ukraine is a very corrupt country, and it is naïve to think that will change regardless of the war’s outcome. These interests are of secondary consideration in foreign policy, however. Security interests based on the international balance of power always matter the most.
In some of these ways, too, it is understandable why there is skepticism about more Ukraine aid in Washington. The war has only confirmed my long-held beliefs about Russia, namely that it is a second-rate declining power that poses few direct security concerns for the United States. Russia failed in its pre-war objective to topple the Ukrainian government and bring Kyiv back into its orbit. It now must settle for, at best, minor territorial gains that do not significantly improve its geostrategic position, at the cost of hundreds of thousands of casualties and crippling international sanctions. It will not in our lifetimes be as strong as it was on February 23rd, 2022, and Russia is increasingly dependent on China, whose foreign currency reserves it is amassing in vast swathes since Beijing is one of the few bulk customers for Russian energy these days.
With these facts in mind, natural, longstanding bipartisan grievances against NATO allies become enhanced. Yes, America’s NATO allies in Europe are far more capable of defending themselves against Russia than America’s Asian allies are of defending themselves against China, if only the former would pay their fair share. Yes, the Indo-Pacific is by far the most important area for American foreign policy at this time in history. Why should the United States continue to dump money and, more importantly, ammunition (of which there is a shortage) into Ukraine when the balance of power in the much more important region is eroding, and America’s stockpiles are short?
The anti-Ukraine actors rarely ask these questions, much to their detriment, because they would raise more serious concerns about how to best implement a cohesive national security strategy. However, this would not trend on social media or cable news, so the theater matters more to them.
There is a reason to keep aiding Ukraine, though, and it comes from geopolitical realism. Put simply, such aid enhances America’s standing in the international balance of power. Policymakers should be realistic about the purpose of this aid, though. Ukraine’s offensive in Zaporizhzhia has been a disappointment. Six months after it began, it has not even reached the city of Tokmak, its initial objective, and it has paid a high price for such modest gains. Russia adapted to the Ukrainian successes of 2022, especially by making its important military infrastructure harder for HIMARS to target. Berdiansk and the Sea of Azov seem well out of reach of Ukraine’s present military capabilities.
However, Ukraine has demonstrated adaptability of its own, breaching the first two of Russia’s defensive lines in Zaporizhzhia in autumn campaigning. These breaches have not led to a wider breakthrough but demonstrate Ukraine’s capability to continue fighting effectively.
That said, supporters of additional Ukraine aid should not have unrealistic expectations. Putin understands his political survival is at stake, and as we have seen at Avdiivka, he is consequently willing to throw more resources into the struggle to ensure the war does not end in complete failure for him. It is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to recapture its pre-invasion, much less pre-2014 territory, with the means it has and will likely have available. In early 2023, Western leaders privately began to admit this. As the new year begins, that assessment must be stronger.
So why should aid be continued as the war approaches its second anniversary despite these sobering realities? Again, the answer is based on a pure balance of power calculation.
While true figures are still understandably hard to come by, the British Ministry of Defense estimates that Russia has suffered between 240,000 and 290,000 total casualties in Ukraine, with 150,000 to 190,000 of those being deaths or permanent injuries. These figures do not include the Wagner Group, which suffered tens of thousands of casualties in the Battle of Bakhmut. For its part, American intelligence estimated a 315,000 casualty figure for Russia, amounting to a staggering 90% of the personnel it had at the start of the war.
Aside from these casualties, Russia has suffered the loss of at least 2,500 tanks, 3,140 infantry fighting vehicles, 388 armored personnel carriers, 95 aircraft, 133 helicopters, 19 ships and submarines, and significant numbers of other assets. These are only the visually confirmed losses listed on Oryx. The true number is probably higher.
The total American aid given to Ukraine as of October 2023 is $75.4 billion. This is a significant sum of money but a drop in the bucket compared to all federal spending, which amounted to about $6.5 trillion in 2022, including over $1 trillion in military-related spending.
In other words, for pennies on the dollar, aid to Ukraine is destroying Russia’s ability to wage war and project power. Putin may yet come out of the conflict with additional territory he can sell as a victory through sheer willingness to invest, but America’s goal should be to make this victory as narrow and costly as possible, one which will erode Russia’s threat to Europe for the foreseeable future. With reduced Russian power in Europe, the United States will be in a much better position to finally shift much of its military resources from that continent to the Indo-Pacific. So far, Ukrainian aid is accomplishing this objective, although it will take a frustrating time to materialize.
Many skeptics of aid to Ukraine had hoped to court Russia into an anti-China coalition. Before the war, I also hoped for this, but that is no longer possible. The sheer amount of Chinese currency (which is of little use in the international marketplace) in Russian banks alone guarantees that. With this in mind, we should remember that by eroding Russia’s threat to Europe, America also erodes China’s ways to influence that continent.
Despite their “unlimited strategic partnership,” there is tension between Moscow and Beijing. The latter has designs on the Arctic and Russian Far East, which is why China wouldn’t mind a Russian loss in Ukraine. America should not want Russia to get so weak that it becomes a total vassal to China. This should be the only limitation on the current aid to Ukraine. However, we have not reached that point yet.
For now, it remains in America’s interest to keep arming Ukraine. Such calculations are admittedly cynical, but that is how it has always been in international relations. Try as we might to escape from it, we still live in the world of Thucydides.
Jordan Carpenter received his BA in Political Science from Fordham University in 2011, with coursework in international law, political theory, and political ethics. He was Assistant to the President at New York Civic, under Henry Stern, from 2012 to 2017 and is currently a script writer for The Military Show on YouTube.
Nice piece Jordan! What I liked is that you first, clearly, laid out an argument for why aid might be problematic. As you alluded, with the advent of social media, balanced thoughtful pieces are becoming more rare.
And how did I NOT know of The Military Show. Thinking this will become a common place for me to visit.