Kirkpatrick Misunderstood

The progressive left and the populist right both fail to see the whole of Kirkpatrick's argument.

Isolationists and Internationalists Splitting Up Kirkpatrick's Critiques

What we have seen, from both the progressive and liberal left as well as the populist right, is both sides taking the views which Kirkpatrick criticizes in her essay and splitting them. The left often portrays itself in terms applicable to liberal internationalism, which she disliked about Carter. Many on the right now have overcorrected from its failure to heed Kirkpatrick's critique of the idea that "it is possible to democratize governments, anytime, anywhere, under any circumstances," and now dwells on criticisms of Ukraine's admittedly imperfect fledgling democracy. Both leave themselves open to major policy failures. On the left is the possibility of allowing groups that are often against US interests to become more prevalent; on the right, we have the possibility that Ukraine may collapse because it was not democratic enough. 

On the Left

The issue with the left when it comes to their arguments about Ukraine is they often associate Ukraine with international institutions that aren’t always helpful to US interests. They are wrong to cast Ukraine's fate and importance in overly internationalist and gauzy terms. By making arguments for supporting Ukraine in terms of a "rules-based world order," they have made supporting Ukraine similar to the "deterministic," "moralistic," and "cosmopolitan" "force"-based mindset that Kirkpatrick critiques. The issue with the left’s view of Ukraine is the very issue that Kirkpatrick saw at the heart of the Carter administration. In her section discussing the “modernization paradigm” undertaken by Carter and his administration, Kirkpatrick notes that “... the Carter administration’s foreign policy is with the modernization of the Third World.” later going on the define it as being, 

“In its current form, the concept of modernization involves more than industrialization, more than “political development” (whatever that is). It is used instead to designate “. . . the process through which a traditional or pre-technological society passes as it is transformed into a society characterized by machine technology, rational and secular attitudes, and highly differentiated social structures.” Condorcet, Comte, Hegel, Marx, and Weber are all present in this view of history as the working out of the idea of modernity.” 

The adoption of the modernization paradigm led the Carter administration to believe that they could help bring about modern states through American foreign policy. Kirkpatrick believed this to be wrong-headed, stating “Although the modernization paradigm has proved a sometimes useful as well as influential tool in social science, it has become the object of searching critiques that have challenged one after another of its central assumptions.” She believed that the Carter administration’s view of themselves being the “midwife” of history, led them to believe that forces rather than people were what shaped events. 

“This perspective on contemporary events is optimistic in the sense that it foresees continuing human progress; deterministic in the sense that it perceives events as fixed by processes over which persons and policies can have but little influence; moralistic in the sense that it perceives history and U.S. policy as having moral ends; cosmopolitan in the sense that it attempts to view the world not from the perspective of American interests or intentions but from the perspective of the modernizing nation with both revolution and morality, and U.S. policy with all three.”

This belief held by the Carter administration is shared by liberals today. In the case of Ukraine, they do not believe that it is people who are shaping the future of Ukraine but forces outside their control. Much like Carter, all they can do is act as the midwife to history. The Biden administration's slow rolling of aid to Ukraine seems to resemble the Carter admin's lackluster response to the events that took place in South America, the Middle East, and Asia. This leaves today's administration with an apolitical view of world events which discourages a proper American response and is instead encouraging the US towards passivity. 

On the Right

The issue we see from the right when it talks about Ukraine is how many realists are making arguments they don't believe in whatsoever. For some time now, realists have been deeply skeptical of the idea of democracy promotion. Often associated with George W. Bush’s administration's supposed attempts to build democracies in the Middle East, realists have grown to deem such endeavors as being “neoconservative” in origin. What we have seen from many of these more passionate realists, when it comes to arguing against Ukraine, is them taking arguments off the neocon shelf as it were. They say Ukraine is not “free enough” or that they are not “more democratic” or that freedom of speech is being trampled by Zelenkyy’s government. 

These things don't matter in the slightest to them, however. Rewind to 2003 and the Iraq War. If one were to make these very arguments about why the move to dispose of Saddam Hussein was sound, these very same realists would say, and often did say, “Why does that matter?” or “Why should we care?” Why is it then that realists, when it comes to Ukraine, borrow from the moral capital of the pro-democracy arguments? If they were often left skeptical and dissatisfied by the answers given to them by those at publications like The Weekly Standard and figures in the Bush admin, why do they then use those arguments today? If it was bad then, why is it suddenly good now? 

This double standard used by realists often flies in the face of their remarks. When Tucker Carlson laments the loss of civil liberties of those living in Ukraine because of the tyrannical rule of Zelenkskky, you would never have guessed that he has openly praised Viktor Orban and Vladmir Putin despite both being guilty of the same crimes, at various levels, that he accuses Zelenskky of. Instead, Tucker happily rolls out the red carpet for the Hungarian strongman and lavishes him with praise on a daily basis. 

If the realists are serious with their sudden worry about the state of Ukraine’s political freedoms, to force liberalization now would be an extremely dangerous thing. As Kirkpatrick notes, previously forcing such changes in a time of major conflict allows alternative forces to emerge. Such as the case of Iran, trading the Shah (Zelenskky) for the Ayatollah (Putin) would not only lead the region to become more hostile to American interests but also trade one pro-American figure for an enemy. Surely, if realists are deeply concerned with the well-being of the Ukrainian people, as they try to make themselves look, they would find conclusions along the same lines as Kirkpatrick and see that an Ayatollah-backed regime, or in our case today a Putin-backed regime, would inflict harsher punishments and less freedom than what they might face under Zelenskky, who is far more amiable to the United States. 

“Surely it is now beyond reasonable doubt that the present governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos are much more repressive than those of the despised previous rulers; that the government of the People’s Republic of China is more repressive than that of Taiwan, that North Korea is more repressive than South Korea, and so forth. This is the most important lesson of Vietnam and Cambodia. It is not new but it is a gruesome reminder of harsh facts.”

If the US were to force Ukraine to hold wartime elections, something which would leave the nation vulnerable to the outside influence of the Russian government, this would then allow an opportunity for Putin to tear the country apart from the inside. Whether it would end with an attempt to subvert the election process via hacking or give the Russian military the chance to practice bombing areas with high amounts of civilian life, i.e. polling stations, the result would be disastrous for a government that has worked to acclimate themselves to western political climates, and more importantly U.S. interests. Where in 2014 he was able to use Yanukovych’s loss to separate Crimea from Ukraine, an election sometime this year or in 2025 could similarly allow Putin to strike at Kyiv. Again quoting Kirkpatrick, 

“It may not always be easy to distinguish between democratic and totalitarian agents of change, but it is also not too difficult.”

Jake Kroesen graduated from the University of Central Missouri with a BS in Political Science and International Law. His writings have appeared in National Review and The Vital Center.