Ukraine's Offensive: the Good, the Bad, and the Possible

The offensive near Kursk looks promising, but has potential drawbacks.

Fear of renewed Russian expansion has plagued the Kremlin’s neighbors for years. The Russians, by contrast, attacked Ukraine under the rather childish delusion that they were going to invade everybody without being invaded in return (to modify a WWII-era quote from Arthur Harris, head of RAF bomber command). Well, here we are in 2024, and the unthinkable has happened: the Russians are enjoying a dose of their own medicine.

Ukraine’s invasion has captured headlines, boosted domestic morale, and generated considerable schadenfreude among informed observers, not to mention all long-suffering victims of Russian bellicosity. But it is not merely an advance that would have seemed unthinkable a dozen years ago. It is an advance that remains surprising today—surprising because it is a risky gamble with unclear long-term objectives. What matters is not the initial shock, but the long-term effects. Those effects could be minimal for both parties; they could be very bad for Ukraine; or they could be very bad for Russia.

Tactics: maneuver warfare—and caution

The offensive is much like Ukraine’s successful fall 2022 advance in northern Kharkiv, when mobile units cut through lightly-defended Russian lines by moving in small groups, bypassing strong points, and surrounding and routing isolated Russian units. Both operations were designed by Gen. Oleskandr Syrskyi, then commander of Ukrainian ground forces and now commander-in-chief of the entire Ukrainian military. Syrskyi has a controversial reputation—he allegedly micromanages tactics and sometimes disregards the lives of his troops—but is apparently good at planning this kind of medium-scale maneuver operation.

It is not clear, though, how much farther Ukraine can advance, or how rapidly. This map shows an overview of the situation:

Ukrainian forces have seized the town of Sudzha, across the border from the Ukrainian city of Sumy. It is a rail and gas transport hub with a population just north of 5000. By itself, however, it is not so important. They will probably take the town of Korenevo, northwest of Sudzha, in the next few days, and will soon take the strip of land south of the river Sejm—they have destroyed all three bridges across the river with missiles and guided bombs, so the Russians are now reduced to using pontoons. But this area is lightly populated. An advance on the city of Kursk would change the entire trajectory of the war, but isn’t realistic right now: Ukraine has too few troops and is already advancing far more slowly, now that the element of surprise is gone. Besides, Russia is preparing new fortified defensive positions on the Rylsk-Lgov highway, about ten miles north of the Sejm. It will be difficult to break through them.

So, unless something changes dramatically, expect Ukrainian forces to advance a little farther and then dig in to foil inevitable Russian counterattacks. They will be holding a chunk of territory that is not small, but also rural and not terribly significant. A second Battle of Kursk, 80 years later? Not so much.

Strategic tradeoffs

President Zelensky has described the invasion as intended to create a “buffer zone” in Russia. Such a zone would prevent cross-border attacks, like Russia’s renewed advance on Kharkiv in May. But Ukraine’s invasion obviously has broader objectives: Russia has demonstrated no near-term designs on the Sumy region, so it would be silly to expend valuable reserves to pre-empt an improbable attack.

Ukraine’s real strategic objective is likely three-pronged. First, the operation aims to gain leverage for eventual negotiations. Second, it seeks to divert Russian troops from the Donbas. Third, Ukraine is pursuing several other long-range political objectives—weakening Putin, raising domestic morale, and ensuring continued Western support, including looser restrictions on the use of Western weapons inside Russia.

If this war is headed for a negotiated peace, Ukraine needs negotiating leverage. Holding Russian territory eliminates the most obvious Russian proposal: freeze fighting along current lines of contact. Ukraine can use the offensive to pressure Russia into negotiating from a position of weakness, and might try to trade Kursk for the Donbas.

But that only works if Ukraine can hold a sizeable chunk of Russian territory while halting Russian advances in Donetsk. That depends on objective number two: forcing Russian redeployment to Kursk.

At the time of the invasion, Kursk’s defenses rested mostly on young conscript troops and Chechen “Akhmat” militias. Neither have performed well: the Chechens are looting Russian villages before running off, while hundreds of conscripts have surrendered. Russia has shifted experienced troops from Ukraine, and has consequently reduced its operational tempo in several sectors. But it has not pulled troops assaulting Pokrovsk, a key logistics hub west of Avdiivka, where advances continue. That is the main area of concern for Ukraine right now. Russia also has enough aerial assets to sustain heavy glide bomb strikes on both the Kursk and Pokrovsk fronts. (Large-scale use of guided glide bombs, launched from beyond the reach of Ukrainian air defenses, represents Russia’s most notable tactical innovation over the last year. Much of Russia’s continued Donbas advance rests on these airstrikes, and F-16s are most useful, for now, as a means of countering them.) And of course, all the Ukrainian troops and material in Kursk could be deployed to defend Pokrovsk instead.

It will not be possible (or easy, anyway) to retake Ukrainian gains in Kursk without reducing pressure on Pokrovsk. But it might be possible to stop the Ukrainian advance without committing more Donbas units. Russia’s willingness to redeploy battle-hardened assets to Kursk will depend on a political calculation: how much does the symbolic inviolability of Russian borders really matter? From a military standpoint, it makes good sense to slow down or hold the Ukrainians inside Russia, seize Pokrovsk, and only then consider a serious Kursk counteroffensive. Pokrosvk is a much more valuable target than, say, Korenevo, and Ukraine will encounter less favorable casualty ratios once it reaches prepared Russian defenses—even if conscripts are manning them.

And that brings us to the political considerations: the offensive embarrasses Putin, but it does not threaten his rule. It is a local problem, a problem that can be managed. At least one poll (I don’t know how reliable it is) shows that Russians are more anxious in the wake of the invasion, but much less so than they were when Putin mobilized in 2022. And it is public sentiment in Moscow and St. Petersburg that matters to Putin, to the extent public sentiment matters at all.

It might help loosen weapons restrictions on Russian soil—Ukraine is using HIMARS, Western armor, and various kinds of air-launched bombs in the offensive, without any complaints. But permission to launch cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles remains elusive, and ultimately that is what matters.

Finally, the invasion has raised Ukrainian morale, even on the beleaguered Pokrovsk front. But you do not launch a risky operation merely to raise morale. That is, at best, a happy side effect.

Why take the risk?

The invasion will amount to a clear success if Ukraine can hold Russian territory and also freeze Russian progress in the Donbas. That is a tall order, though, and it is very possible Russia will accept some losses in Kursk while renewing its onslaught against newly weakened Ukrainian lines in the south. The invasion is a gamble.

Unfortunately, that gamble looks more rational if Ukraine planned it amid a pessimistic assessment of the war’s overall trajectory. Consider a counterfactual: suppose Ukraine threw all those troops and equipment into the Donbas instead. Syrskyi might have decided that Pokrovsk was going to fall anyway. Or else Zelensky might have worried that Western support would not outlast Russia’s remaining equipment and manpower, especially after the US election, and was afraid of being forced into negotiations on Russian terms. Given that kind of troubling outlook, a bold gamble makes sense: maybe it does divert troops or shock Russia into committing errors. Even if it does not, and Pokrovsk still falls, at least Ukraine’s short-term negotiating position looks a little better.

The Kursk offensive could have other, less logical intellectual origins, and I rather hope it does. But it is possible that Ukraine invaded because it worries it cannot win a war of attrition. That is a problem for us, not just for Ukraine: no nation backed by the arsenal of democracy should fear stinginess. For now, we must do our best to turn Ukraine’s gamble into a safe bet: remove our veto on using ATACMS and cruise missiles on Russia soil, share intelligence on targets inside Russia, speed up F-16 deliveries, and surge ammunition deliveries to make sure Ukraine has enough for both fronts at once.