What specifically do you think a better deterrence policy would look like? I agree with you, but I’d like you to give some more detail on strategy and policies we should consider.
I’ve got a few:
- Establish a military presence on Taiwan, both Marine and Navy (station destroyers, LCS, and perhaps frigates there). Assuming their consent of course.
- Increase the size and effectiveness of the Navy. Distributed operations and greater integration with the Marine Corps. Greater Naval presence in the world.
- Increased partnerships with allies. We may not be willing to have WWIII for Ukraine but we can give them more advanced weaponry. (Harden the target as in the case with Taiwan.)
- Increase the size of the survivable leg of the nuclear triad.
- put the breaks on the shift to completely networked/smart (ie hackable) weaponry and platforms. Dumb platforms can’t be hacked.
- In general, MAD deterrence isn’t appropriate for these low-level, quick attacks like Crimea. Focusing on hardening the targets (increasing the cost for the aggressor) rather than MAD will be more useful. Instead of arming Taiwan to the point where they’d win an all-out war with China (likely impossible), we can get them to the point where it’s painful enough that China won’t bother. Ditto Russia and Ukraine.
What specifically do you think a better deterrence policy would look like? I agree with you, but I’d like you to give some more detail on strategy and policies we should consider.
I’ve got a few:
- Establish a military presence on Taiwan, both Marine and Navy (station destroyers, LCS, and perhaps frigates there). Assuming their consent of course.
- Increase the size and effectiveness of the Navy. Distributed operations and greater integration with the Marine Corps. Greater Naval presence in the world.
- Increased partnerships with allies. We may not be willing to have WWIII for Ukraine but we can give them more advanced weaponry. (Harden the target as in the case with Taiwan.)
- Increase the size of the survivable leg of the nuclear triad.
- put the breaks on the shift to completely networked/smart (ie hackable) weaponry and platforms. Dumb platforms can’t be hacked.
- In general, MAD deterrence isn’t appropriate for these low-level, quick attacks like Crimea. Focusing on hardening the targets (increasing the cost for the aggressor) rather than MAD will be more useful. Instead of arming Taiwan to the point where they’d win an all-out war with China (likely impossible), we can get them to the point where it’s painful enough that China won’t bother. Ditto Russia and Ukraine.